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RECONSIDERING REPRISALS 
MICHAEL A. NEWTON* 
ABSTRACT 
The prohibition on the use of reprisals is widely regarded as one of 
the most sacrosanct statements of the jus in bello applicable to the conduct 
of modern hostilities. The textual formulations are stark and subject to no 
derogations. Supporters of the bright line ban describe it as a vital 
“bulwark against barbarity.” In the words of the International Committee 
of the Red Cross, the prohibition is “absolute,” despite the fact that the 
declarations of key states indicate residual ambiguity over the scope of 
permissible reprisals, particularly in the context of non-international 
armed conflicts. Reprisals are a recurring feature of state practice, though 
conducted under varying legal rubrics and shifting rationales. Reasonable 
reprisals grounded on an empirical assessment of their deterrent value or 
framed as appropriate punishment for prior acts of terror may be the most 
morally acceptable and humane strategy for serving a strategic imperative 
of civilized society. Limited reprisals may in practice be essential to 
counteract the growing threat of transnational terrorists. Reasonable 
reprisals may represent the best long term way to erode support for those 
who would mobilize terrorist actors to willfully ignore the rules protecting 
innocent civilians thereby violating the most basic human rights of their 
victims. This is especially true if nations create clear lines of agreed legal 
authorities supported by independent adjudication of the motives and 
methods employed in such reprisals. Peace-loving states should seek 
common ground to enhance efforts to protect innocent citizens from the 
effects of terrorist violence. Thoughtful and multilateral reassessment of 
the lawful scope and rationale for reasonable reprisals is overdue. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The prohibition against armed reprisals remains one of the most well 
established jus in bello benchmarks, at least in principle and in textual 
proscription. Acts of reprisal are strongly disfavored on the face of the 
Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols.1 They are 
nevertheless, and have been, widespread in actual state practice,2 albeit 
often carried out under alternative legal rubrics and shifting rationales. 
Rather than relying on a clear right of reprisals grounded in the law 
regulating the conduct of hostilities, states have most frequently resorted to 
the rhetoric of sovereign prerogative in defense of national security 
interests or other vital sovereign assets as the rationale for de facto 
reprisals. This shift into the de fault realm of jus ad bellum leaves many 
unanswered questions and assures that every decision to use force against 
terrorist actors is not only highly scrutinized, but also highly suspect when 
viewed through the jus in bello lens.3 From the perspective of the 
aspirational goals of humanitarian law, it might be considered heresy for 
any international lawyer to contemplate reconsideration of the normative 
rationale and scope for reasonable armed reprisals. That is precisely the 
purpose of this brief essay. 
As former U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld wrote, “[t]here 
is a point at which everything becomes simple and there is no longer any 
question of choice, because all you have staked will be lost if you look 
 
 1. See infra notes 31-49 and accompanying text. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
specifically reinforces the provisions of the Geneva Conventions related to reprisals in the material 
breach provisions of Article 60. States may not invoke material breach as a ground for terminating a 
treaty or suspending its operation in whole or in part when another state has breached obligations 
related to “the protection of the human person contained in treaties of a humanitarian character, in 
particular to provisions prohibiting any form of reprisals against persons protected by such treaties.” 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 60(5), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 
(1969) (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). 
 2. See, e.g., William V. O’Brien, Reprisals, Deterrence and Self-defense in Counterterror 
Operations, 30 VA. J. INT’L L. 462, 464-65 (1990); Michael J. Kelly, Time Warp to 1945—Resurrection 
of the Reprisal and Anticipatory Self-Defense Doctrines in International Law, 13 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & 
POL’Y 1, 16-17 (2003) (discussing the U.S. bombings in Tripoli, Libya in response to what was 
characterized as a “pattern of indiscriminate violence” against U.S. citizens by Libya); U.S. Explains Its 
Missile Attack on Iraq to Security Council, Agence Fr.-Press, June 27, 1993, available at 1993 WL 
10739350 (discussing the U.S. argument that the bombing of Iraqi targets in response to the 
assassination attempt on former president George H. W. Bush was an act of legitimate self defense); 
Amos N. Guiora, Self-Defense - From the Wild West to 9/11: Who, What, When, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 
631, 661-62 (2008) (discussing the targeting of al Qaeda linked targets in Sudan and Afghanistan by 79 
cruise missiles in response to the bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania). 
 3. See, e.g., William H. Taft IV, Self-Defense and the Oil Platforms Decision, 29 YALE L.J. 295 
(2004). 
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back. Life’s point of no return.”4 September 11 removed any ability for 
responsible governments to hide behind a façade of complacent 
commercial pursuits because acts of transnational terrorism threaten the 
economic, social, and institutional foundations of states around the world. 
Phrased another way, the very foundations of modern society, grounded on 
respect for humanity dignity and the individual worth of each citizen, 
would be fundamentally altered if leaders succumb to the manipulation and 
the will of those who plan and orchestrate transnational terrorist acts. If 
indeed acts of terror can be categorized as deliberate attacks against the 
fabric of civilized society and the interests of peace-loving peoples, then 
the most fundamental obligation of governments is to ensure the survival of 
societal order by using every feasible method to deter their repetition and 
eradicate the threat of recurring terrorism. 
The paradox is that the most humane way to preserve human lives and 
liberties in the larger sense may be to use limited armed reprisals that many 
would argue are, by definition, inhumane and seemingly random from the 
narrow perspective of the (often innocent) recipients. Thus, nearly a decade 
after the shock of the September 11 attacks, the civilized nations of the 
world struggle to articulate a common framework for repressing acts of 
transnational terror and for responding in a swift and unified manner when 
appropriate. In effect, the very certainty of the legal prohibition on reprisals 
creates an unsettling indeterminacy precisely because it reveals a chasm 
between the common sense of ordinary people who know that terrorists 
must be stopped if societal order is to endure and the conflicting 
obligations of governments to abide by settled international law while 
defending the lives and property within their jurisdiction. 
One principle of international law and unity is absolutely clear. 
Terrorism in all its forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most 
serious threats to international peace and security, as well as perhaps the 
most pernicious threat to the fundamental human rights of private peace-
loving citizens even nearly a decade after September 11. There is universal 
and strongly articulated support for the positivist legal premise that “any 
acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their 
motivation, whenever and by whomsoever committed and are to be 
unequivocally condemned.”5 The U.N. General Assembly reaffirms that 
 
 4. DAG HAMMARSKJÖLD, MARKINGS 66 (transl. Leif Sjöberg & W.H. Auden 1981). 
 5. S. C. Res. 14565, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1456 (2003). The United Nations 
Global Counterterrorism Strategy reiterates the “strong condemnation” of the international community 
and states the same principle as follows: “terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed by 
whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes.” 
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“no terrorist act can be justified in any circumstances.”6 The security, 
stability, economic vitality, sovereignty, political independence, and citizen 
safety of all states should be protected against terrorist acts, irrespective of 
how democratic or human rights compliant the government in question. It 
is inconceivable that organized societies or the governments that are sworn 
to protect and defend their interests would merely shrug in resignation to 
the reality of ongoing transnational terrorism. 
These cornerstones of legal and policy cohesion spawned an 
extremely rare fever of international unity in the aftermath of the al Qaeda 
attacks in New York and Washington, D.C. President Bush declared a state 
of national emergency,7 and the U.N. Security Council swiftly passed 
Resolution 1368 on a unanimous vote categorizing the attacks as a “threat 
to international peace and security,” affirming the “inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defense” expressed in Article 51 of the U.N. 
Charter, and specifically directing “all States to work together urgently to 
bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist 
attacks.”8 For the first time in its storied existence, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (“NATO”) invoked the principle of Article 5 of the 
Washington Treaty, thereby recognizing that the attacks constituted an 
“armed attack” consistent with the treaty’s provisions that trigger NATO 
obligations to assist another member so attacked.9 NATO aircraft helped to 
fly combat air patrols over U.S. airspace in the immediate wake of the 
attacks.10 
On September 20, 2001, President Bush addressed a joint session of 
Congress, aware that the world—and perhaps key figures in the terrorist 
network—were listening. He declared that “we are a country awakened to 
danger and called to defend freedom. Our grief has turned to anger, and 
anger to resolution. Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring 
justice to our enemies, justice will be done.”11 The declaration of this clear 
 
 6. UNGAOR (62d Sess.), Agenda Item 108, Measures to eliminate international terrorism, 13 
Nov. 2007, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/62/L.14. 
 7. Proclamation No. 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,199 (Sept. 14, 2001). 
 8. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001). The Security Council stressed that 
“those responsible for aiding, supporting or harbouring [sic] the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of 
these attacks will be held accountable.” Id. 
 9. Press Release, NATO, Invocation of Article 5 Confirmed (Oct. 2, 2001) http:// 
www.nato.int/docu/update/2001/1001/e1002a.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2009). 
 10. NATO and the fight against terrorism, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48801.htm 
(last visited May 21, 2010) (describing Operation Eagle Assist which lasted from October 2001 to May 
2002 and was intended to free up U.S. air assets for strikes against Afghanistan, from which the 
September 11 attacks were planned and launched). 
 11. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist 
Attacks of September 11, 2001, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1140 (Sept. 20, 2001), available at http:// 
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national goal was met by the thunderous applause of the assembled 
Congress and audience (which also included British Prime Minister Tony 
Blair). His words stirred citizens across America to strengthen a communal 
resolve and rededicate a mutual commitment to the goal of justice. 
President Bush further declared that the campaign against international 
terrorism12 is more than just a fight to secure American freedoms because it 
is “civilization’s fight” in the sense that it will be waged on behalf of all the 
people who “believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom.”13 
Congress responded by enacting the Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use 
of United States Armed Forces Against Those Responsible for the Recent 
Attacks Launched Against the United States (“AUMF”). The much 
discussed, and arguably much abused, AUMF authorized the president “to 
use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, 
or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the 
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 . . . .”14 However, 
those who pose serious threats to the people and property of the United 
States will not always be associated with al Qaeda, nor within the domestic 
authority granted by the AUMF. Civilized nations that seek to deter 
terrorist acts in the future are forced to either make contorted arguments 
that will likely be rejected by a politicized United Nations as in the past, or 
simply disregard the textual prohibitions of the Geneva Conventions and 
 
www.dartmouth.edu/~govdocs/docs/iraq/092001.pdf [hereinafter Joint Session]. Secretary of State 
Powell echoed a similar sentiment in his first public comments made in Lima, Peru: 
A terrible, terrible tragedy has befallen my nation, . . . but . . . you can be sure that America 
will deal with this tragedy in a way that brings those responsible to justice. You can be sure 
that as terrible a day as this is for us, we will get through it because we are a strong nation, a 
nation that believes in itself. 
BOB WOODWARD, BUSH AT WAR 10 (2002). 
 12. For a definition of international terrorism, see 18 U.S.C. § 2331, providing that for the 
purposes of the federal criminal law, the term 
“international terrorism” means activities that 
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the 
criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if 
committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; 
(B) appear to be intended – 
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; 
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or 
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping; and 
(C) occur primarily outside the territory jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend 
national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they 
appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which the perpetrators operate or seek 
asylum. 
 13. Joint Session, supra note 11. 
 14. Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Those 
Responsible for the Recent Attacks Launched Against the United States, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 
224 (2001). 
NEWTON_JCI.DOC 6/11/2010  10:54:21 AM 
366 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 20:361 
the Additional Protocols. Thus, the current complete ban on reprisals 
against non-state actors or the state officials that support and sponsor them 
may prevent future U.S. administrations from addressing emerging threats 
before many more lives are lost and transnational terrorists disrupt 
international order. 
In tension with the paralysis spawned by the textual prohibitions of the 
jus in bello, the emotionalism of ordinary people following the immediate 
aftermath of the September 11 attacks generated a reality that is generally 
unnoticed, or at least tactfully overlooked by international law elites and 
academics. The esoteric discussion of “justice” in the context of terrorist 
acts does not provoke images of ardent advocacy before marbled benches 
or admiration for arguments regarding evidentiary exceptions. At a visceral 
level, both the immediate victims and the larger societal interests yearn for 
some sort of retribution. We know “justice” when we see it, and our human 
nature leads many to hope that terrorists will feel some measure of the pain 
that they inflicted on innocents. If commentators candidly acknowledged 
the conversations in families around the world affected by terrorist 
violence, they would concede that at some base level transnational 
terrorists who target and kill innocent victims on an indiscriminate basis 
deserve to be punished for that cruelty. Attacks on innocent victims stir an 
inevitable undercurrent of yearning for retribution, or even revenge, in its 
starkest form. 
On the one hand, thoughtful modernists are aware that a quest for 
revenge on a personal or societal level is unseemly and likely 
counterproductive to lasting peace. Our moral compass would be troubled 
if we could contemplate a degree of pleasure from deliberate infliction of 
human suffering, even if we deemed it to be well earned and deserving 
based on a larger utilitarian calculus. Many citizens would be vaguely 
ashamed that part of our consciousness would exult in acts of retaliation. 
Even then, the undercurrent of emotion that “they got what they deserved” 
would bring a comforting assurance that the baseline of our civilized 
structures cannot be reshaped at the whim of terrorist actors. At the same 
time, organized civil society subconsciously rejects perspectives that 
postulate a moral or legal equivalence between an enemy that deliberately 
and repeatedly violates the basic norms of international law and a 
professional military that is required to “comply with the law of war during 
all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and in all 
other military operations.”15 On the 60th anniversary of the Geneva 
 
 15. See, e.g., DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE 2311.01E, DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM, ¶ 4.1 (9 
May 2006), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/231101p.pdf. This Directive 
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Conventions, the U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations, for 
example, articulated the rationale for jus in bello norms that preserve 
appropriate discipline and the humanity of state actors because “those who 
take hostages, or send trucks bombs into apartment buildings, or rockets 
into civilian neighborhoods have no legitimacy.”16 
Resuscitation of the law of reprisals has the potential to provide 
precisely the kind of pressure release valve to channel the cognitive cross 
currents noted above. To be clear, in my view reasonable and rational 
armed reprisals should not be confused with a wholly justifiable 
condemnation of collective punishments. It is not at all the purpose of this 
short essay to propose a sweeping regime of indiscriminate retaliation not 
rooted in the clear responsibility of individual wrongdoers. Given the 
extensive framework of developed humanitarian law, this essay postulates 
that the bright-line rule banning all reprisals under all circumstances creates 
imprecision that may actually facilitate further terrorist crimes by hindering 
effective state responses. The imperative to act on the basis of popular will 
may explain the prevalence of state action to retaliate against threats to 
persons and property, even when policy makers took great pains to 
carefully describe their actions by reference to more acceptable legal and 
moral frameworks. In a larger sense, a reconsideration of the law of 
reprisals could close the gap between the phraseology of international law 
and its practice in the gritty world of pragmatism in pursuit of imperative 
state interests. Reprisals are prohibited in theory, as will be explained in 
more detail below. Nevertheless, the generalized cloud of good will 
generated by the bright-line prohibition may foster further illegal acts on 
the part of non-state actors who feel as though they are unconstrained by 
the norms of international law, yet are simultaneously protected from state 
retaliation by the very treaties they disregard and exploit. 
Furthermore, this essay in no way contemplates resuscitation of a 
genus of reprisals that would permit state actors to lash out against persons 
based on high emotion or the pressure of popular opinion whether or not 
 
replaced the 1998 Directive that required that United States Armed Forces to “comply with the law of 
war in the conduct of military operations and related activities in armed conflict, however such conflicts 
are characterized.” This is a policy statement worthy of commendation that also makes pragmatic sense 
from the standpoint of the commander responsible for controlling the conduct of hostilities in a lawful 
manner; it must also be understood in the context of the clear jurisprudential rejection of any defense to 
war crimes based on an argument of tu quoque or lack of reciprocity by an opponent in an armed 
conflict. Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević, Case No. IT-98-29/1-A, ¶ 250 (Appeals Judgment, 12 Nov. 
2009) (upholding the Trial Chamber sentence of 29 years confinement). 
 16. Ambassador Susan E. Rice, Statement by Ambassador Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent 
Representative to United Nations, on 60th Anniversary of Geneva Conventions, Dec. 3, 2009 (on file 
with author). 
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there is a clearly defined operational purpose and concomitant 
consideration of the applicable principles of humanitarian law. Mere acts of 
emotive revenge never create the conditions of lasting peace. Acts of 
emotional revenge directed against innocent civilians are crimes under all 
circumstances, and ought to be seen as illegal and indeed imprudent as an 
operational matter precisely because they undermine the popular support 
that will be the decisive element in eliminating the phenomenon of 
terrorism in the next decade. Quite the contrary, when states do act, as they 
often have in the past thirty years since the complete ban on reprisals took 
root in the soil of the Additional Protocols, they are forced to defend their 
actions on alternative legal grounds. State action that constitutes what I 
believe would accurately be described as reprisals, such as, inter alia, the 
bombing of Tripoli, or the cruise missile strikes in Sudan17 and Afghanistan 
following the failed attempt to murder former president George H. W. 
Bush, is recognizable as such to the population of non-legal laypeople yet 
is normally justified using the rhetoric of lawful self defense conducted 
pursuant to the inherent right of sovereign states. Because there are no 
internationally defined standards for lawful reprisals, the corresponding 
commingling of jus ad bellum with jus in bello constraints has created legal 
uncertainty that clouds the legality of state responses to terrorist acts and 
hinders rapid responsiveness to protect people’s basic rights. 
At worst, the current legal uncertainty emboldens terrorists because, 
while humanitarian law belongs to the armed forces of the world and 
imposes an inalterable professional obligation, the legal lacunae permit 
terrorist information operations to make it into a media tool to be 
manipulated and sensationalized. The incoherence in explaining sovereign 
responses to terrorist acts permits the legal structure to be portrayed as 
nothing more than a mass of indeterminate subjectivity that is nothing more 
than another weapon in the moral domain of conflict at the behest of the 
side with the best cameras, biggest microphones, and most compliant 
media accomplices. There is a very real danger that terrorist video tapes 
and leaked statements can create manipulation of an all too willing 
international media and therefore mask genuine violations of the law with 
spurious allegations and misrepresentations of the actual state of the law. 
Failure to articulate the correct state of the law in turn feeds into an 
undercurrent of suspicion and politicization that erodes the very 
foundations of humanitarian law. At the very least, the current legal 
 
 17. See, e.g., El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Co. v. United States, 559 F.3d 578 (D.C. Cir. 
2009) (affirming the dismissal of claims related to the 1998 bombing in Sudan on the basis that the 
President’s publicly stated self defense rationale and the purported linkage of the pharmaceutical plants 
owners to terrorist organizations are non-justiciable political questions). 
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framework allows terrorist organizations and their sympathizers to portray 
state responses as legally questionable. In the future, reasonable reprisals 
grounded on an empirical assessment of their deterrent value or framed as 
appropriate punishment or retribution for prior acts of terror may be the 
best way of eroding support for those who would mobilize terrorist actors 
to willfully ignore the rules protecting innocent civilians and violate the 
most basic human rights of their innocent victims. Limited reprisals may 
well be the most moral and humanitarian response to the growing threat of 
transnational terrorism. 
The current state of affairs requires international law to bear too much 
weight, and has the predictable consequence of causing critics to discount 
the larger endeavor to regulate conflicts. Commenting on the impractical 
aspects of Additional Protocol I, the eminent Dutch jurist Bert Röling (who 
served on the bench of the Tokyo International Military Tribunal) observed 
that treaty provisions ought not “prohibit what will foreseeably occur” 
because the “laws of war are not intended to alter power relations, and if 
they do they will not be observed.”18 The disconnects between aspirational 
legal rules and human experience are borne out in operational experience 
by states that act decisively to protect the lives and property of their 
citizens, which feeds an undercurrent of suspicion and politicization that 
could erode the very foundations of humanitarian law. This gap in turn 
leads to a cycle of cynicism and second-guessing that could weaken the 
commitment of some policy makers or military forces to actually follow the 
law. 
More to the point, the absence of express authority to plan and 
conduct careful reprisals against those who plan and practice acts of 
transnational terror creates precisely the climate that may well generate 
additional acts of terrorism. Thus, a thoughtful reconsideration of reprisals 
is in order for those who seek to craft an international legal regime that is 
both effective at inducing compliance yet responsive to evolving 
international experience.19 This essay will conclude by framing the 
rationale for reconsideration of the flat prohibition on reprisals. Before 
considering the merits of what would be a highly controversial 
reconsideration, the next section will recount the historical basis for the 
prohibition and its current articulation in the authoritative texts governing 
jus in bello. 
 
 18. Bert Röling, Criminal Responsibility for Violations of the Laws of War, REVUE BELGE DE 
DROIT INT’l, 12, 25-26 (1976), quoted in GEOFFREY BEST, WAR & LAW SINCE 1945 391 (1997). 
 19. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. 
REV. 1823 (2002); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 
(1997). 
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I. THE LEX LATA OF REPRISALS 
International law restricts the class of persons against whom violence 
may be applied during armed conflicts, even as it bestows affirmative 
rights to wage war in accordance with accepted legal restraints. Because of 
the central importance of these categorizations, the standards for 
ascertaining the legal line between lawful and unlawful participants in 
conflict provided the intellectual impetus for the evolution of the entire 
field of law relevant to the conduct of hostilities.20 From the outset, states 
sought to prescribe the conditions under which they owe particular persons 
affirmative legal protections derived from the laws and customs of war. 
The recurring refrain in negotiations in this field for the past century can be 
described as “to whom do we owe such protections and under what 
circumstances do we owe them?” The constant effort to be as precise as 
possible in describing the classes of persons entitled to jus in bello 
protections is essential, because the same criteria prescribe the select class 
who may lawfully conduct hostilities with an expectation of immunity. 
Conversely, the law has attempted to clarify the proper scope of persons 
and property who may lawfully be subjected to the effects of hostilities. 
In that vein, the doctrine of reprisals has been an aspect of the effort to 
regulate the conduct of conflict from the very onset of efforts to develop a 
positivist regime. The first comprehensive effort to describe the law of war 
in a written code (the Lieber Code) began as a request from the general-in-
chief of the Union armies, motivated by his confusion over the distinction 
between lawful and unlawful combatants and the accompanying 
obligations of a responsible commander towards participants in conflict 
who are not associated with a sovereign state.21 Based on the stimulus of 
 
 20. The field is frequently described as international humanitarian law. This vague rubric is 
increasingly used as shorthand to refer to the body of treaty norms that apply in the context of armed 
conflict as well as the less distinct internationally accepted customs related to the treatment of persons. 
The core of the international law of war includes the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 
75 U.N.T.S. 31, 6 U.S.T. 3114 (replacing previous Geneva Wounded and Sick Conventions of 22 Aug. 
1864, 6 July 1906, and 27 July 1929 by virtue of Article 59) [hereinafter Sick & Wounded Convention]; 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 6 U.S.T. 3217 
(replacing Hague Convention No. X of 18 Oct. 1907, 36 Stat. 2371) [hereinafter Sick & Wounded at 
Sea Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for 
signature Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 6 U.S.T. 3316 (replacing the Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Protection of Prisoners of War of 27 July 1929, 47 Stat. 2021) [hereinafter Prisoner of War 
Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War, opened for 
signature Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 6 U.S.T. 3516 [hereinafter Civilians Convention]. 
 21. Letter from General Halleck to Dr. Francis Lieber, Aug. 6. 1862, reprinted in RICHARD 
SHELLY HARTIGAN, LIEBER’S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 2 (1983) (this letter is justifiably seen as 
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Confederate conduct, the Union army issued a disciplinary code governing 
the conduct of hostilities (known worldwide as the Lieber Code) as 
“General Orders 100: Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the 
United States in the Field” in April 1863.22 This was the first 
comprehensive military code of discipline that sought to define the 
parameters of permissible conduct during conflict. Then, as now, the laws 
and customs of war remain integral to the very notion of military 
professionalism by defining the class of persons against whom professional 
military forces can lawfully apply violence based on principles of military 
necessity and reciprocity.23 The principle endures in the law that persons 
who do not enjoy lawful combatant status are not entitled to the benefits of 
legal protections derived from the laws of war (including prisoner of war 
status)24 and are subject to punishment for their warlike acts. 
Seeking to deter violations of the professional code of conflict, Article 
27 of the Lieber Code contemplated reprisals (defined by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”) as acts “not otherwise lawful”) 
based on the truism that 
 
the catalyst that initiated more than a century of subsequent legal development around the world that led 
to the modern framework of international humanitarian law). 
 22. INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD 
(Government Printing Office 1898) (1863), reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT: A 
COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 3-23 (Dietrich Schindler & 
Jiri Toman eds., 1988) [hereinafter Lieber Code]. For descriptions of the process leading to General 
Orders 100 and the legal effect it had on subsequent efforts, see Grant R. Doty, The United States and 
the Development of the Laws of Land Warfare, 156 MIL. L. REV. 224 (1998), and George B. Davis, 
Doctor Francis Lieber’s Instructions for the Government of Armies in the Field, 1 AM. J. INT’L L. 13 
(1907) (The Lieber Code was a disciplinary code originating in the need for clear command guidance to 
be promulgated, which in turn spawned more than a century of positivist legal evolution in the field of 
international humanitarian law regulating the conduct of hostilities and the rights of those participating 
in conflict or caught in the consequences of ongoing conflicts). 
 23. Unlawful Belligerency After September 11: History Revisited and Law Revised, in NEW 
WARS, NEW LAWS ? APPLYING THE LAWS OF WAR TO 21ST CENTURY CONFLICTS 75 (David Wippman 
& Matthew Evangelista eds., 2005). For detailed discussion of the role of attorneys and the military 
culture that seeks disciplined compliance with the professional norms governing the conduct of 
hostilities see Michael A. Newton, Modern Military Necessity: The Role & Relevance of Military 
Lawyers, 12 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 869 (2007) and Leslie C. Green, What is – Why is There – 
The Law of War, in ESSAYS ON THE MODERN LAW OF WAR 1 (2d. ed. 1999). 
 24. This statement is true subject to the linguistic oddity introduced by Article 3 of the 1907 
Hague Regulations, which makes clear that the armed forces of a state can include both combatants and 
non-combatants (meaning chaplains and medical personnel), and that both classes of military personnel 
are entitled to prisoner of war status if captured. See Regulations annexed to Hague Convention IV 
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 1907, art. 3 (“the armed forces of the belligerent 
parties may consist of combatants and non-combatants. In the case of capture by the enemy, both have a 
right to be treated as prisoners of war”), entered into force Jan. 26, 1910, reprinted in DOCUMENTATION 
ON THE LAWS OF WAR 73 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter 
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR]. 
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The law of war can no more wholly dispense with retaliation than can 
the law of nations, of which it is a branch. Yet civilized nations 
acknowledge retaliation as the sternest feature of war. A reckless 
enemy often leaves to his opponent no other means of securing himself 
against the repetition of barbarous outrage.25 
Framed as a necessary measure in order to preserve some recourse for 
responding to brutalities committed by enemy forces, Lieber recognized 
that reprisals ought of right to be a last recourse, and one that he 
characterized as “the sternest feature” of war. Given the horrors of warfare 
in his era, Lieber’s caution should be given great credence. Even in the 
context of 1863, Professor Lieber recognized the dangerous moral hazards 
that reprisal could engender by observing that 
Retaliation will, therefore, never be resorted to as a measure of mere 
revenge, but only as a means of protective retribution, and moreover, 
cautiously and unavoidably; that is to say, retaliation shall only be 
resorted to after careful inquiry into the real occurrence, and the 
character of the misdeeds that may demand retribution. 
 
Unjust or inconsiderate retaliation removes the belligerents farther and 
farther from the mitigating rules of regular war, and by rapid steps 
leads them nearer to the internecine wars of savages.26 
Reprisals in practice have the duality of being a historically well-
established mechanism for deterring violations of the law of armed conflict 
even as they provide an ostensible rationale for otherwise unthinkable 
atrocity. This is indeed a “curious position,” because while their use by 
definition involves conduct that would otherwise constitute grievous 
violations of humanitarian law, their deterrent value is undermined by the 
potential for grievous retaliatory abuses.27 
As only one of many possible illustrations of the moral and legal 
complexities inherent in reprisals, historians often cite the German atrocity 
committed on June 10, 1944 in which all 642 inhabitants of the French 
town of Oradour-sur-Glane were executed in reprisal for the killing of one 
German officer by resistance fighters (legally unprivileged belligerents 
whose combatant activities constituted a war crime prior to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions). According to German accounts, the reprisal 
followed the German discovery of 73 German soldiers who were tortured 
and murdered in the town of Tulle following their surrender to a partisan 
 
 25. Lieber Code, supra note 22, art. 27. 
 26. Id., art. 28. 
 27. See generally FRITS. KALSHOVEN, BELLIGERENT REPRISALS (2d. ed. 2007). 
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force. The Germans hung nearly a hundred men based on suspicions that 
they were involved in the massacre of German prisoners because, in the 
words of one German officer, the partisans “butchered with bestial cruelty, 
tortured, mutilated and ignominiously treated an opponent who was 
protected by the Geneva Convention and international law, as well as by 
the Franco-German armistice of 1940, and who furthermore had 
surrendered. Thus they placed themselves beyond the bounds of the laws of 
warfare and of humanity.”28 
It is easy to see why one legal expert who participated in the 
negotiations for the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions 
referred to Oradour-sur-Glane and opined that “reprisals achieve nothing,” 
and “never result in the triumph of the rule of law” even when ostensibly 
justified by enemy war crimes.29 In any event, permissible reprisals can 
never be warranted on the basis of simple revenge or retaliation, and the 
Oradour-sur-Glane facts illustrate the difficulty of distilling a pure motive 
for any given act of reprisal. Indeed, it is clear that a claim of reprisal can 
in fact serve as a subterfuge for widespread and deliberate attacks against 
civilians.30 Such orchestrated state murder in the form of intentional attacks 
against the civilian population is the essence of barbarity in warfare and 
impermissible under any legal rationale in any type of conflict under any 
conceivable circumstances. 
Reprisals against prisoners of war were forbidden by the 1929 Geneva 
Convention, and omitted from the 1929 Convention dealing with the 
wounded and sick only “due to an oversight.”31 The subsequent ICRC 
proposal to ban reprisals against all wounded and sick, prisoners of war, 
and civilians was “approved unanimously and without opposition of any 
 
 28. The Story of Oradour-sur-Glane, http://www.scrapbookpages.com/Oradour-sur-Glane/Story/ 
SSversion02.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2010). 
 29. Konstantin Obradovic, The Prohibition of Reprisals in Protocol I: Greater Protection for War 
Victims, 520, 526 INT. REV. OF THE RED CROSS (Nov. 20 1997). 
 30. The example of state practice in the war between Iran and Iraq from 1980 to 1988 is also 
worth considering. At that time, and at the time of this essay, neither state was a party to Protocol I, 
although they had ratified the four Geneva Conventions. Despite pleas by the United Nations Security 
Council and the ICRC, both parties to the conflict reserved the right to take reprisals in response to 
violations of the laws of war by their opponent. Kalshoven asserts that the so-called “reprisal 
bombardments” were not genuine reprisals, but willful attacks on the civilian population of the enemy, 
“with the reprisal argument merely serving as a flimsy excuse.” This duplicitous use of the reprisals 
doctrine may render this evidence of State practice useless. Shane Darcy, The Evolution of the Law of 
Belligerent Reprisals, 175 MIL. L. REV. 184, 222 (2003) (citing Frits Kalshoven, Belligerent Reprisals 
Revisited, 21 NETH. Y. B. INT’L L. 43, 62 (1990); U.N. Doc S/RES/0540 (1983); 1983 ICRC Annual 
Report 58 (Geneva 1983)). 
 31. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA 
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶ 807, at 242 (Y. Sandoz, Ch.Swinarski & B. Zimmermann eds., 
1987) [hereinafter ICRC Commentary on Protocol I]. 
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sort” during the next round of multilateral negotiations.32 Thus, all four of 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions contain express prohibitions33 on reprisals, 
the most notable of which is the extension to the civilian occupants of 
occupied territory who are legally categorized as “protected persons” 
within the meaning of the Fourth Geneva Convention. 
Given the abuses in World War II, courts developed a sophisticated 
framework for evaluating claims of reprisal raised as an affirmative defense 
during war crimes prosecutions. There were many successful prosecutions 
in post-war military commissions in which national authorities evaluated 
and rejected defense claims of legitimate reprisal.34 In one representative 
but unreported case, a German general officer was convicted in 1947 for 
placing allied prisoners of war alongside an oil refinery in lower Silesia 
allegedly as a reprisal (though he could not specify for what acts) and 
refusing them access to air raid shelters when the Allies bombed the 
legitimate military target, thereby committing the crime of murder.35 Based 
on this pattern of state practice, one of the field’s most preeminent experts 
summarized the requirements for a permissible reprisal in the wake of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions as follows:36 
1) It must be a response to a prior violation of international law which 
is imputable to the state against which the reprisal is directed;37 
2) It must be reasonably proportionate; 
3) It must be undertaken for the purpose of putting an end to the 
enemy’s unlawful conduct and preventing further illegalities and not 
for mere revenge; and 
4) Since reprisals are a subsidiary means of redress, no other effective 
means of redress must be available. 
Other authoritative sources indicate that in addition to the above 
considerations, reprisals must be based on reasonable notice as appropriate 
to the circumstances, must be publicized (presumably to facilitate their 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. Sick & Wounded Convention, supra note 20, art. 46; Sick & Wounded at Sea Convention, 
supra note 20, art. 47; Prisoner of War Convention, supra note 20, art.13; Civilians Convention, supra 
note 20, art. 33. 
 34. For a summary of this line of cases, see SHANE DARCY, COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 139-48 (2007). 
 35. UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 155, ¶ 8.29 
n.103 (2004). 
 36. Christopher Greenwood, The Twilight of Belligerent Reprisals, in ESSAYS ON WAR IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 295, 299 (2006). 
 37. For the more exhaustive United Kingdom enunciation of the criteria for legitimate reprisals 
based on the caselaw of the era and state practice see UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE 
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 35, 419, ¶ 16.17. 
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deterrent effects), authorized only “at the highest level of government” 
(presumably to exclude emotive acts of personal revenge), and must be 
discontinued after the enemy eschews the egregious conduct that warranted 
reprisals in the first place.38 
The ink was hardly dry on the texts of the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
when the ICRC began to advocate a further expansion of the law. The 
Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions resulted from four widely 
attended diplomatic conferences held from 1974 to 1977. As noted above, 
the law of war continually evolves in response to the needs of states 
conducting conflict. The Protocols culminated the efforts to provide textual 
application of the Geneva Conventions even in the context of armed 
conflicts between a High Contracting Party and non-state actors, such as 
guerrillas, insurgents, and so-called freedom fighters.39 These fundamental 
modifications to the well-established law of combatant immunity would 
have arguably been impossible without the backdrop and international 
division caused by the Cold War. However, as in previous efforts to shape 
the law of war around the reality of ongoing military and political realities, 
the effort to draw sharp legal distinctions between protected civilians and 
persons who could be lawfully targeted was the “driving concern” behind 
the modern evolution embodied in the 1977 Protocols.40 
Additional Protocol I was intended to be an all encompassing source 
for updated rules for determining combatant status, as it was meant to 
govern international armed conflicts, and to “reaffirm and develop” the 
measures intended to protect the victims of armed conflict drawn from the 
1949 Geneva Conventions by completing their humanitarian imperative.41 
Protocol I in essence combined the Hague strand of international 
humanitarian law (dealing with constraints on the means and methods for 
conducting hostilities) with the Geneva strand (primarily focused on 
achieving humanitarian goals). Despite the overtly politicized context in 
which it was negotiated, it represented the end state of the law of 
combatancy by attempting to reduce the combatant category to its 
irreducible minimum while maximizing the class of persons and objects 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. See Michael A. Newton, Exceptional Engagement: Protocol I and a World United Against 
Terror, 42 TEX. INT’L L. J. 323, 342-56 (2009). 
 40. BEST, LAW AND WAR, supra note 18, at 257. 
 41. Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949 (Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts), art. 1, para 3, Dec. 12, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144 Annex 
I, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol I]. 
NEWTON_JCI.DOC 6/11/2010  10:54:21 AM 
376 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 20:361 
protected from the adverse effects inherent in all armed conflicts.42 In light 
of these normative goals, it should not shock the reader to realize that 
Additional Protocol I extended the preexisting prohibitions on reprisals to 
include: 
1) The entire population of civilians not taking direct part in hostilities, 
irrespective of their location;43 
2)  Civilian objects;44 
3) Historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which 
constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples;45 
4) Objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population such 
as foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and 
supplies, and irrigation works;46 
5) The natural environment;47 
6) Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, 
dykes, and nuclear electrical generating stations.48 
The official ICRC Commentary notes that the ban on all forms of reprisal 
in Protocol I “removes the only doubt that might remain with regard to the 
absolute character of the obligations imposed on Parties to the conflict.”49 
Additional Protocol I attempted to elevate non-state actors to the 
status of lawful combatants, but the efficacy of those textual promises has 
been eroded to a vanishing point by states’ unified and repeated 
opposition.50 In the real world, the effort to decriminalize terrorists’ 
 
 42. See Civilians Convention, supra note 20, art. 4. The legal category of “protected persons” was 
not originally intended to be an all-inclusive category of civilians even on the face of the Convention. 
Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides a definition of the legal term of art “protected 
persons” that limits the applicability of the protections afforded by the other provisions of the 
Convention as follows (using admittedly odd grammar): 
Art. 4. Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given moment and in any 
manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a 
Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals. 
 
Nationals of a State which is not bound by the Convention are not protected by it. Nationals 
of a neutral State who find themselves in the territory of a belligerent State, and nationals of a 
co-belligerent State, shall not be regarded as protected persons while the State of which they 
are nationals has normal diplomatic representation in the State in whose hands they are. 
 43. Protocol I, supra note 41, art. 51(6). 
 44. Protocol I, supra note 41, art. 52(1). 
 45. Protocol I, supra note 41, art. 53(c). 
 46. Protocol I, supra note 41, art. 54(4). 
 47. Protocol I, supra note 41, art. 55(2). 
 48. Protocol I, supra note 41, art. 56(4). 
 49. ICRC Commentary on Protocol I, supra note 31, ¶ 814, at 242. 
 50. See Newton, supra note 39, at 347-56 (documenting the refusal of some states to accept the 
legal premise and its rejection by others in the form of understandings and reservations attached to 
ratifications of Protocol I); MARK OSIEL, THE END OF RECIPROCITY: TERROR, TORTURE, AND THE LAW 
OF WAR 186-88 (2009). 
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conduct—so long as it complied with applicable jus in bello constraints in 
the context of wars of national liberation—ran aground on the shoals of 
sovereign survival. In practical terms, the Protocol I provisions regarding 
combatant status for non-state actors in international armed conflicts have 
only residual value as “agitational or rhetorical” tools because they have 
never been applied.51 At the same time, the striking silence in the law 
applicable to non-international armed conflicts means that any effort to 
describe a “combatant engaged in a non-international armed conflict” is an 
oxymoron. By extension, there is no form of “combatant immunity” in the 
context of non-international armed conflicts.52 Terrorists and their 
supporters have no form of automatic legal license or protection from 
prosecution, even for acts that would be perfectly permissible when 
conducted by combatants in an international armed conflict. There simply 
is no legal category of “combatant” in a non-international armed conflict 
irrespective of the moral imperatives claimed by one party or the other to 
warrant hostile activities.53 This premise remains valid even when non-state 
actors perpetrate violence seeking to accomplish goals similar to those of 
the sovereign state.54 Non-state actors who participate in hostilities remain 
subject to appropriate sanctions. 
 
 51. BEN SAUL, DEFINING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 76 (2006). 
 52. David P. Forsythe, Legal Management of Internal War: The 1977 Protocol on Non-
International Armed Conflicts, 72 AM. J. INT’L L. 272, 284 (1978). 
 53. In fact, a wide range of states coalesced around the effort to defeat the diplomatic draft 
applicable to non-international armed conflicts that was tabled in 1975 by the ICRC and supported by 
the U.S. and other western European nations. The group of states, which included Argentina, Honduras, 
Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Indonesia, India, Romania, and the U.S.S.R, succeeded in raising the 
threshold for the application of Additional Protocol II, which was designed to regulate non-international 
armed conflicts, precisely because of fears that extending humanitarian protections to guerillas and 
irregular forces might elevate the status of rebel groups during such conflicts. ELEANOR C. MCDOWELL, 
DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1975, U.S. Department of State 
Publication 8865, 803-6 (1976). The United States also succeeded in eliminating subjective qualifiers 
such as “significant” or “important” that might have permitted some states to selectively apply the 
provisions of Protocol II. Id. at 806. 
 54. See Andreas E. Feldmann & Maiju Perala, Assessing the Causes of Nongovernmental 
Terrorism in Latin America, 46 LATIN AM. POL. AND SOC’Y 101, 104 (2004). 
This article defines terrorism as ‘the use or threat of use of anxiety-inducing extranormal 
violence for political purposes by any individual or group, whether acting for or in opposition 
to established governmental authority, where such action is intended to influence the attitudes 
and behavior of a target group wider than victims. (Mickolus et al. 1989a xiii).’ For the 
purpose of this work, terrorist incidents are restricted to actions that purposely seek to spread 
terror in the population either by directly targeting noncombatants or by destroying 
infrastructures that may affect the life and well-being of the civilian population at large. . . . 
Insurgent, revolutionary, and right-wing terrorism are generally included under the terrorism 
rubric. 
Id. 
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Similarly, it is conceivable that non-state actors could be subject to 
appropriate punishments in the form of reprisals because the textual ban is 
not at present an all-consuming incontrovertible norm. While the 1949 
Conventions and Additional Protocol I regulate armed conflicts conducted 
between “two or more High Contracting Parties” and contain the textual 
language noted above, the ICRC Customary International Law Study 
determined that “it is difficult to conclude that there has yet crystallized a 
customary rule specifically prohibiting reprisals during the conduct of 
hostilities.”55 The treaty provisions applicable to non-international armed 
conflicts (certainly the dominant mode of modern conflict) are silent with 
respect to specific prohibitions on reprisals because the delegates 
negotiating Protocol II could not reach consensus on the issue.56 At the 
other extreme, though four states spoke to affirm the permissibility of 
limited reprisals under specifically enumerated circumstances, the ICRC 
correctly concluded that there is “insufficient evidence that the very 
concept of lawful reprisal in non-international armed conflict has ever 
materialized in international law.”57 
Widespread and consistent state practice following the treaty 
prohibitions described above tends to undercut the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) Trial Chamber’s assertion in 
Prosecutor v. Kupreskic that reprisals are subject to “universal revulsion” 
based on the premise that they are “inherently a barbarous means of 
seeking compliance with international law.”58 Setting aside the many 
instances of state practice [recitation of which would be far beyond the 
scope of this short essay] that would indicate recourse to reprisals in fact if 
not in phraseology, the lack of uniform acceptance even of the stark treaty 
prohibitions belies their nature as customary norms. For example, the 
Italian government made the following declaration upon ratification of the 
Protocol: “Italy will react to serious and systematic violations by an enemy 
of the obligations imposed by Additional Protocol I and in particular 
Articles 51 and 52 with all means admissible under international law.”59 
The German,60 Egyptian,61 and French62 governments all made declarations 
 
 55. JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW, Vol. I 523 (2005) [hereinafter ICRC Study]. 
 56. DARCY, supra note 34, 166-71. 
 57. ICRC Study, supra note 55, at 527. 
 58. Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, No. IT-95-16-T, ¶ 528 (Jan. 14, 2000) (Judgment). 
 59. Reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 24, at 507. 
 60. Id. at 505 (the German declaration regarding serious and systematic violations of the laws and 
customs of war is virtually identical to the Italian declaration quoted in the text above, and ostensibly 
preserves the right to engage in limited reprisals, particularly in non-international armed conflicts). 
 61. Id. at 504. 
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indicating that resort to reasonable reprisals in extreme circumstances could 
be warranted to respond to ongoing violations by an adversary. 
In addition, the United Kingdom emphasized in its own statement that 
any adversary must “scrupulously observe” the obligations of humanitarian 
law, and accordingly “serious and deliberate attacks” against the civilian 
population will entitle its forces to “take measures otherwise prohibited by 
the Articles” to the extent that such measures are “necessary for the sole 
purpose of compelling the adverse party to cease committing violations.”63 
Thus, it is logically and legally consistent that none of the constitutive 
documents of international or internationalized tribunals formed over the 
past two decades have deemed the taking of reprisals against any persons 
or objects as an articulated violation of the laws of armed conflict.64 The 
Statutes of the ICTY, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the highly comprehensive Rome 
Statute for the International Criminal Court have all refrained, by this 
omission, from commenting on the legality of reprisals. 
In short, the lex lata does not appear to support the sweeping 
conclusion of the ICTY Trial Chamber that “the rule which states that 
reprisals against the civilian population as such, or individual civilians, are 
prohibited in all circumstances, even when confronted by wrongful 
behaviour [sic] of the other party, is an integral part of customary 
international law and must be respected in all armed conflicts.”65 Partly on 
 
 62. Darcy, supra note 30, 226 (The government of the French Republic declares that it will apply 
the provisions of Article 51, paragraph 8 in such a way that the interpretation of those will not be an 
obstacle to the employment, in conformity with international law, of those means which it estimates are 
indispensable for protecting its civilian population from serious, manifest, and deliberate violations of 
the Geneva Conventions and this Protocol by the enemy). 
 63. UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT , supra note 35, 
421, ¶ 16.19.1 (further clarifying that appropriate reprisals must be proportionate to the nature of the 
enemy violations, constrained by the preexisting prohibitions of the 1949 Conventions, based on formal 
authority from the “highest level of government” and only occur following formal warnings). 
 64. This point becomes apparent after comparison of the various constitutive documents of the ad 
hoc and internationalized tribunals, as well as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. See 
also Darcy, supra note 30, 244. 
 65. Prosecutor v. Martic, Review of the Indictment Under Rule 61, Case No. IT-95-11, ¶ 19 (8 
Mar. 1996). The addition of an entirely new international convention in 1949, designed to create legal 
entitlements on behalf of the civilian population, gave rise to the dualistic view of status that persists in 
some quarters to this day. The ICRC took the position in its official commentary that because there “is 
no intermediate status” between combatant and civilian, every person in enemy hands “must have some 
status under international law.” ICRC, COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 
1949: VOLUME 4, 51 (Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross 1958) (“Every person in enemy hands must have 
some status under international law: he is either a prisoner of war and, as such, covered by the Third 
Convention, a civilian covered by the Fourth Convention, or again, a member of the medical personnel 
of the armed forces who is covered by the First Convention. There is no intermediate status; nobody in 
enemy hands can be outside the law.”). 
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the basis of the state practice commingled with the express declarations of 
states, one distinguished human rights scholar concluded that “it cannot be 
stated categorically that the doctrine of reprisals is not of relevance in 
noninternational [sic] armed conflicts.”66 As a result, despite superficial 
appeals to overriding humanitarian imperatives, a thoughtful assessment of 
the rational basis for reviving the hard law of reprisals is in order. 
Thoughtful reassessment is far from a cry for a rush to reinvigorated and 
rampant reprisals. It also bears repeating that in my view it is overly 
simplistic to conflate consideration of a potential role for reprisals in the 
wake of September 11 with a movement to reinforce the primitive law of 
retaliation, lex talionis, which demands equal and exact injury as a form of 
revenge against an adversary. Similarly, as the example of the atrocities at 
Oradour-sur-Glane illustrates, the debate over the utility of reprisals ought 
not to degenerate into coarse calls for collective retribution and cannot 
provide the subterfuge for the intentional murder of innocents.67 
II. WHY REPRISALS MIGHT BE RATIONAL TOOLS OF STATE 
POWER 
Reasonable reprisals may represent the best long-term way to erode 
support for those non-state actors who would willfully ignore the 
humanitarian rules protecting innocent civilians, thereby violating the most 
basic human rights of their victims. The resurgence of deliberate terror 
aimed at western civilization destroyed any residue of the naïve notion that 
there is a bright legal line neatly dividing armed conflicts into distinct 
geographic combat zones in which innocent civilians (who are legally 
protected from deliberate hostilities) are never commingled with 
combatants who may lawfully be targeted and killed.68 The attacks 
transformed an esoteric problem that was important only to specialists in 
the law of armed conflict into a tactical and legal problem highly relevant 
to current operations. Al Qaeda and its supporters acted as private citizens 
in declaring war on American citizens and values,69 and carried out their 
 
 66. DARCY, supra note 34, 171 (noting also that the divergence of opinion expressed by the ICRC, 
the ICTY, and scholars and the lack of prohibition contained in Protocol II indicates that the absolutist 
stance of the ICRC reflects a “precautionary attempt motivated by humanitarian concerns” rather than 
an embedded legal prohibition that is reflective of the developed state of law). 
 67. See infra notes 27-31 and accompanying text. 
 68. This dualistic view of the law was privately expressed by the International Committee of the 
Red Cross and publicly expounded by a number of commentators on the law of armed conflict. 
 69. Osama bin Laden has made more than fifty declarations of war against the United States 
(summary of statements on file with author). In the official fatwa signed by Bin Laden and four others 
on February 23, 1998 he asserted that 
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attacks with a purposeful intensity that rose to the level of armed conflict 
by any common sense definition. Moreover, the conflict against al Qaeda 
and its supporters is an armed conflict governed by the law of armed 
conflict within the meaning of the term as accepted by the ICTY.70 
However, despite rhetoric referring to a struggle for liberation and self 
determination, no nation would ever accept the normative proposition that a 
private group of terrorists acted with a legally cognizable expectation of 
combatant immunity. Indeed, the essence of asymmetric warfare is 
achieved when professionalized military forces confront an enemy who 
seeks to gain an otherwise impossible military parity through exploitation 
of a deliberate disregard for humanitarian law.71 The hallmark of modern 
combat operations is that non-state actors deliberately exploit civilians to 
gain significant tactical and strategic advantages. A small group of non-
state actors can inflict harm to innocent victims and the structures of 
ordered society that is far disproportionate to their numbers or 
 
The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual 
obligation for every Muslim who can do it in any country—this until the al-Aqsa Mosque 
[Jerusalem] and the Holy Mosque [Mecca] are liberated from their grip, and until their armies 
withdraw from all the lands of Islam, defeated, shattered, and unable to threaten any Muslim. 
This is in accordance with the word of the Most High—“Fight the pagans all together as they 
fight you all together,” and the word of the Most High “Fight them until there is no more 
tumult or oppression, and all religion belongs to Allah.” 
And the Most High said “And why should you not fight in the cause of Allah and on behalf of 
those oppressed men, women and children who cry out Lord! Rescue us from this town and 
its oppressors. Give us from Your Presence some protecting friend. Give us from Your 
Presence some defender.” 
By Allah’s leave, we call on every Muslim who believes in Allah and wishes to be rewarded 
to comply with Allah’s order to kill the Americans and seize their money wherever and 
whenever they find it. We also call on Muslim ulema, leaders, youths, and soldiers to launch 
the raid on the Devilo’s Army—the Americans—and whoever allies with them from the 
supporters of Satan, and to rout them so that they may learn a lesson. 
THE AL QAEDA READER 13 (Raymond Ibrahim, ed. and transl. 2007). 
 70. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on Defense Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction), ¶ 70 (Oct. 2, 1995) (“an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to 
armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and 
organized armed groups or between such groups within a State”). 
 71. Walter Laquer, The Terrorism to Come, HOOVER INSTITUTION POLICY REVIEW, 3-4, (Aug. & 
Sept. 2004). 
When regular soldiers do not stick to the rules of warfare, killing or maiming prisoners, 
carrying out massacres, taking hostages or committing crimes against the civilian population, 
they will be treated as war criminals. If terrorists behaved according to these norms they 
would have little if any chance of success; the essence of terrorist operations now is 
indiscriminate attacks against civilians. But governments defending themselves against 
terrorism are widely expected not to behave in a similar way but to adhere to international law 
as it developed in conditions quite different from those prevailing today. Terrorism does not 
accept laws and rules, whereas governments are bound by them; this, in briefest outline, is 
asymmetric warfare. If governments were to behave in a similar way, not feeling bound by 
existing rules and laws such as those against the killing of prisoners, this would be bitterly 
denounced. 
Id. 
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technological inferiority. Al Qaeda and its supporters accordingly forfeited 
the rights that would normally accrue to civilian persons caught in the 
midst of hostilities, chief among them the right to be free from deliberate 
efforts at targeting them.72 
The clarity with which international law categorizes and condemns 
discrete manifestations of terrorism nevertheless masks the indeterminacy 
of the underlying definitional framework. “Terrorism” is a concept caught 
in a kaleidoscope of conflicting sociological, political, psychological, 
moral, and legal perspectives. The paradox in a post-September 11 world is 
that the U. N. Security Council requires nations to “accept and carry out”73 
resolutions that oblige them to act against “terrorists” and “terrorism.” 
Breaking down the macro problem of terrorism into identifiable 
manifestations, nation states have negotiated and ratified a web of 
occasionally overlapping multilateral conventions built on the cornerstone 
of the sovereign enforcement of applicable norms. The persistence of 
transnational terrorism as a feature of the international community shows 
that the plethora of conventional criminal approaches is no panacea.74 
September 11 highlighted this striking systematic failure that has been 
reinforced by the repeated attacks orchestrated to intentionally destroy 
civilian lives and infrastructure in inter alia Spain, England, Indonesia, 
India. 
Nevertheless, the commingling of jus ad bellum norms with jus in 
bello constraints may result in a deadly policy paralysis for states that seek 
to adhere to the framework of international law even as they protect the 
lives and property of their citizenry. States will predictably find themselves 
facing an adaptable enemy that may not be targeted on the basis of self 
defense due to an unproven and perhaps unprovable lack of imminency, 
even as they are hindered from rapid jus in bello targeting due to the highly 
 
 72. The law of armed conflict provides that lawful attacks may only be directed at military 
objectives (which includes enemy combatants). Civilians may not be deliberately attacked unless they 
directly participate in hostilities. See Protocol I, supra note 41, art. 51 (2 & 3). Celebrated in 
international law as the principle of distinction, the president of the ICRC opined that this principle is 
“crucial.” Dr. Jakob Kellenberger, International Humanitarian Law at the Beginning of the 21st Century, 
26th Round Table in San Remo on the Current Problems of International Humanitarian Law: “The Two 
Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions: 25 Years Later –Challenges and Prospects,” (Sept. 5, 
2002), http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList74/EFC5A1C8D8DD70B9C1256C36002EF 
C1E  (last visited May 21, 2010). 
 73. U.N. CHARTER, art. 25. 
 74. See generally M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: MULTILATERAL 
CONVENTIONS (1837-2001) (2001) (providing the text of numerous terrorism related international 
agreements, which in turn help to document the historical trends in extending positivist regulation over 
the prohibited range of terrorist acts); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Control of International Terrorism: A 
Policy Oriented Assessment, 43 HARV. INT. L. J. 83, 90 (2001). 
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contested nature of the direct participation criteria that might permit 
uncontroversial operations. At the same time, the confluence of human 
rights protections with the provisions flowing from humanitarian law poses 
another serious political and pragmatic difficulty under the status quo. The 
laws and customs of warfare of course operate against the backdrop of 
human rights norms that elevate the prohibition on extrajudicial executions 
to a non-derogable, unwavering requirement. This is absolutely appropriate 
because the American conception of state power flows from the very 
obligation of governments to defend and protect the lives, rights, and 
property of the citizenry. 
However, the conflation of humanitarian purposes derived from both 
the laws and customs of war and from human rights law to seek maximum 
protection for humanity could be seen as particularly inapplicable in light 
of the terrorist objective of deliberately inflicting casualties and 
maximizing the suffering of innocent humans, of whatever age, gender, or 
ethnicity. Nevertheless, human rights objections prevent most states from 
lauding the killing of specific al Qaeda figures “even when that struggle is 
backed by U.N. Security Council resolutions authorizing force, . . . and 
even given the widespread agreement that the United States had both an 
inherent right and legal authorization to undertake military action against 
the perpetrators of the [September 11] attacks.”75 
A set of measured responses culminating in reasonable reprisals might 
in theory be the best way to balance the humanitarian goals of the 
competing bodies of law. Rather than forcing states to seek recourse in 
pleas of unavoidable necessity or legitimate self defense, a clear-eyed 
reappraisal of the scope and utility of reprisals could produce 
straightforward jus in bello criteria for responding to unlawful acts of 
terror. I do not intend to oversimplify the argument into a simple, and 
completely illegitimate, tu quoque argument. Indeed, that is precisely the 
point. Whether al Qaeda or some future terrorist group disregards the 
fundamental precepts of civilized warfare the legal obligations that inhere 
to law abiding, or at least accepting, states remain fixed and constant. To 
that end, sovereign states should consult together with the aim of creating 
an agreed upon multilateral framework for carefully calibrated responses. 
The “reasonable responses” postulated by this essay are those grounded on 
an empirical assessment of their deterrent value or framed as appropriate 
punishment for prior acts of terror. The archaic phraseology of the Lieber 
Code in this respect seems to resonate in the modern context; i.e., acts 
 
 75. Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law, in 
LEGISLATING THE WAR ON TERROR: AN AGENDA FOR REFORM 346, 364 (Benjamin Wittes ed., 2009). 
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designed “as a means of protective retribution”76 rather than emotional 
vengeance could be permissible. The dichotomy of the Lieber formulation 
is that acts aimed at prospective deterrence as well as those seeking to 
impose a retrospective punishment would be permissible. This would be 
even more acceptable under the oversight of some neutral adjudicative 
body to which states present the facts warranting their lawful exercise of a 
calibrated right of reasonable reprisal. As noted above, in the long run this 
reliance on a reconsidered jus in bello framework may be the most morally 
acceptable and humane strategy for serving a strategic imperative of 
protecting the peace and property of innocent persons. 
Proponents of the blanket ban on reprisals would argue that the term 
“reasonable reprisals” is itself oxymoronic. Indeed, the ICTY Trial 
Chamber in Prosecutor v. Martic inferred that any reprisal conducted in the 
context of a non-international armed conflict would violate customary 
international law as well as the provision of Additional Protocol II 
guaranteeing civilians and those hors de combat the right to be treatment 
humanely “in all circumstances” and “without any adverse distinction.”77 
According to this line of logic, any conceivable reprisal, for any reason, 
and applying any agreed upon framework for implementation would violate 
the “absolute and non-derogable” right to humane treatment. The ICTY 
Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Kupreskic later wrote in a similar vein that 
“the reprisal killing of innocent persons, more or less chosen at random, 
without any requirement of guilt or any form of trial, can safely be 
characterized as a blatant infringement of the most fundamental principles 
of human rights” which in turn compelled the conclusion that “belligerent 
reprisals against civilians and the fundamental rights of human beings are 
absolutely inconsistent legal concepts.”78 
The perspective taken by the ICTY Trial Chambers (and echoed by 
the ICRC in the Customary Law Study) takes the narrowest possible view 
of the human rights of the innocent victims of terrorist attacks. It might 
 
 76. See infra notes 21-27 and accompanying text. 
 77. Prosecutor v. Martic, supra note 64, ¶ 18. 
 78. Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra note 58, ¶ 529. Though the Trial Chamber acknowledged a 
distinct lack of state practice to support a finding that reprisals are prohibited as a matter of customary 
international law, the Trial Chamber was undeterred and in essence fashioned its own unique template 
for discerning the existence of international law: 
This is however an area where opinio iuris sive necessitatis may play a much greater role than 
usus, as a result of the . . . Martens Clause. In the light of the way States and courts have 
implemented it, this Clause clearly shows that principles of international humanitarian law 
may emerge through a customary process under the pressure of the demands of humanity or 
the dictates of public conscience, even where State practice is scant or inconsistent. The other 
element, in the form of opinio necessitatis, crystallising as a result of the imperatives of 
humanity or public conscience, may turn out to be the decisive element heralding the 
emergence of a general rule or principle of humanitarian law. 
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well be said that the ad hoc Tribunal Trial Chambers adopted the view that 
the human rights of the victims of indiscriminate terrorist attacks are 
automatically subordinated to the rights of the persons subject to reprisals, 
irrespective of the calibrated nature of the framework for reprisals accepted 
by states, or the nature of the precedent warnings, or the stated purposes. 
The Trial Chambers also seem to forget that the military commissions in 
the wake of World War II provided detailed legal templates for evaluating 
permissible reprisals from unlawful war crimes (for such issues as, inter 
alia, the scope of permissible proportionality in responding to enemy 
violations). It is also clear that the ICTY decisions took no notice of 
evolving technology that may change the form or focus of future reprisals. 
My point is that a bright-line “bulwark against brutality” prevents any 
good-faith dialogue on the means and methods for balancing humanitarian 
objectives with the overriding strategic imperative of deterring terrorist 
attacks or punishing those who orchestrate indiscriminate violence 
intentionally directed against civilians. 
Finally, the reasoning of the ICTY Trial Chambers would seem to 
discount any calculus of larger moral utility. The current lack of effective 
measures to incentivize non-state armed groups (or terrorist groups) 
towards recognition and compliance with international humanitarian law is 
one of the most insoluble dilemmas facing commanders and policy makers. 
As noted above, deliberate attacks against innocent civilians are crimes 
under all circumstances, both for state and non-state actors. However, 
national security authorities of all states need viable tools in order to 
protect the economic and social structures of civilized society. Thoughtful 
multilateral dialogue on the permissible scope of reprisals directed against 
those who fund, plan, and support terrorist acts could well avoid allegations 
of collective punishment and create a disincentive for terrorist attacks. In 
other words, the concept of “innocent persons” as it relates to terrorist acts 
ought to be an important element of transnational dialogue. The absence of 
any international agreement (or even discussion) of the scope and utility of 
permissible reprisals against those who perpetrate terrorist acts permits 
propagandized exploitation of any state responses, which in turn may 
spread extremist vows for revenge and further endanger innocent civilians. 
Assuming that states agreed to a careful delineated multilateral 
framework for engaging in limited reprisals undertaken only for proper 
motivations and under proper supervision, the relative good achieved by 
the reprisal would certainly be a relevant consideration. To reiterate, the 
current presumption of blanket prohibition prevents rational discussions 
and good faith evaluation of state actions. Effective reprisals may be the 
most moral way to prevent larger atrocities and the concomitant suffering 
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of many more innocent victims. Experience since the 1970s indicates that 
the permission and guidance of an authority figure is the primary enabling 
mechanism which molds people into groups capable of violent operations.79 
History is replete with examples of leaders whose personal influence 
became the essential element leading to military operational 
effectiveness.80 Empirical data is beginning to point clearly to authority 
figures as a major factor in the success or failure of a given military 
operation, and the importance of the authority figure is inflated in an 
asymmetric conflict. The possibility of reasonable reprisals based on a 
priori consensus criteria may well be the most effective method for 
incentivizing non-state actors to comply with the jus in bello, or for 
efficiently sanctioning violations and preventing even more egregious 
suffering by innocent victims. 
The U.S. doctrine for counterinsurgency operations expressly 
highlights this point as follows: “Movement leaders provide strategic 
direction to the insurgency. They are the ‘idea people’ and the planners. 
They usually exercise leadership through force of personality, the power of 
revolutionary ideas, and personal charisma. In some insurgencies, they may 
hold their position through religious, clan, or tribal authority.”81 Reprisals 
that kill a dozen persons but result in the protection of thousands would 
seem to have a compelling moral imperative. Deliberate attacks on such 
movement leaders would foreseeably be controversial under the normal jus 
in bello paradigm given the debates over whether and under what 
circumstances terrorist leaders or other key leaders of non-state groups lose 
their status as protected civilians who are never subject to being 
intentionally targeted. Thus, international law should clarify an alternative 
jus in bello prong that could permit such attacks in limited circumstances. 
 
 79. DAVE GROSSMAN, ON KILLING: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL COST OF LEARNING TO KILL IN WAR 
AND SOCIETY 143 (Little Brown and Company 1995) (“Someone who has not studied the matter would 
underestimate the influence of leadership in enabling killing on the battlefield but those who have been 
there know better. A 1973 study by Kranss, Kaplan, and Kranss investigated the factors that make a 
soldier fire. They found that the individuals who had no combat experience assumed that ‘being fired 
upon’ would be the critical factor in making them fire. However, veterans listed ‘being told to fire’ as 
the most critical factor.”). 
 80. See JOHN KEEGAN, THE FACE OF BATTLE 114 (Penguin Books 1983) (“For the English [at 
Agincourt], the presence of the King would also have provided what present-day soldiers call a ‘moral 
factor’ of great importance. The personal bond between leader and follower lies at the root of all 
explanations of what does and does not happen in battle: and that bond is always strongest in martial 
societies . . . .”); see also id. at 277 (noting that commanders were the most important human factor in 
willing the masses to fight in the First World War) [hereinafter Face of Battle]. 
 81. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL NO. 3-24, MARINE CORPS WARFIGHTING 
PUBLICATION NO. 3-33.5, COUNTERINSURGENCY, at 1-12, ¶ 1-61 (Dec. 15, 2006), available at http:// 
usacac.army.mil/CAC/Repository/Materials/COIN-FM3-24.pdf. 
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Reprisals which either kill or incapacitate the key terrorist leader(s) may 
have a disproportionate effect both in deterring future atrocities and in 
punishing those responsible for past acts. To reiterate, the broad and non-
derogable prohibition on reprisals prevents open discussion about these 
moral implications. 
CONCLUSION 
Reasonable reprisals grounded on an empirical assessment of their 
deterrent value or framed as appropriate punishment for prior acts of terror 
may be the most humane strategy for serving the strategic imperatives of 
civilized society confronted with a persistent and adaptive terrorist enemy. 
Hugo Grotius opined that “punishment of an evil suffered is a just cause for 
waging warfare,”82 and that ancient sentiment might well accord with the 
modern common sense of citizens who suffered at the hands of 
indiscriminate terrorist violence. It is beyond the scope of this essay to 
enumerate the contours of what would constitute reasonable reprisals or to 
elaborate on the circumstances that would warrant their use. That is 
properly the province of state delegates in the real world of countervailing 
interests and colliding spheres of influence. One scholar laments that a 
multilateral treaty that defines terms and identifies the appropriate class of 
persons or objects that can lawfully be the subjects of reprisals during non-
international armed conflicts “is presently most desirable.”83 
In my view, states should unite to craft a deliberate multilateral 
approach to regulating reprisals that embodies a consensus view of the 
appropriate contexts and reasonable constraints that would limit an 
otherwise pernicious practice. The failure to create such a treaty forces 
states to articulate their own rationales for what are in fact reprisals. This 
practice, in turn, creates additional uncertainty given the vicissitudes of 
political postures and the shifting stance of varying judicial panels. 
Reliance on state action and reaction to shape a new customary 
international law of reprisals in turn leads to the real possibility that a more 
expansive regime will be crafted in practice than would otherwise receive 
consensus approval in specified treaty text. In the absence of 
comprehensive treaty provisions related to permissible reprisals, it is clear 
to me that categorical rejection of any concept of reasonable reprisals 
serves to short circuit rational discourse on the issue. The resulting 
 
 82. Anthony F. Lang, Jr., Authority and the Problem of Non-State Actors, in ETHICS, AUTHORITY, 
AND WAR: NON-STATE ACTORS AND THE JUST WAR TRADITION 46, 56-60 (Eric A. Heinze & Brent J. 
Steele eds., 2009). 
 83. Darcy, supra note 34, at 244. 
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uncertainty almost guarantees that state responses to terrorist acts will be 
hindered and less effective than would otherwise be possible. 
It may well be true that reprisals are inadvisable and inappropriate on 
operational grounds or on a policy basis to prevent their value as a 
propaganda tool. As noted above, the spare language of the treaties does 
not settle the issue in the real world of practice. Diplomats debating the role 
and scope of reasonable reprisals may also conclude that they really do not 
materially advance efforts to induce compliance of non-state actors with 
humanitarian law. Such issues could only be clarified through detailed 
negotiations that are forestalled at present by reflexive acceptance of the 
textual prohibitions. 
Nonetheless the laws and customs of warfare were never intended to 
provide a shield behind which terrorists would be free to gnaw away at the 
values of freedom and peace. Private efforts to wage war fall outside the 
structure of law that binds sovereign states together on the basis of 
reciprocity and shared community interests. In the modern vernacular, 
those who commit acts in contravention of the applicable conventions are 
termed terrorists, regardless of their ideological or religious motivations.84 
Thus, as noted above, no state in the world willingly accepts the normative 
proposition that international law bestows upon private citizens an 
affirmative right to become combatants whose warlike activities are 
recognized and protected. The right to engage in appropriate reprisals is 
more than a residual appendage of sovereignty. It reflects the very essence 
of sovereign survival and respect for the dignity and individual worth of 
humans in the context of civilized society. Surely the peace-loving states of 
the world can find common ground in the common pursuit to protect 
persons from the effects of lawless terrorist violence. Thoughtful and 
multilateral reassessment of the lawful scope and rationale for reasonable 
reprisals is overdue. 
 
 
 84. See, e.g., International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 2175 
U.N.T.S. 197, art. 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109 (Dec. 9, 1999) (requiring acceding states to “adopt such 
measures as may be necessary, including, where appropriate, domestic legislation, to ensure that 
criminal acts within the scope of this Convention are under no circumstances justifiable by 
considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar 
nature.”). 
